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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

S'TATE OF u·TAH

J. B. & R. E. WALKER, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs,

-vs.-

No. 8751

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, et al.,
Defendants.
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF

FACTS
Certiorari to the Industrial Conunission of Utah to
review an order granting death benefits under the Utah
Compensation Act, to the surviving widow and minor
child of John Robert Dukes, deceased. The facts of the
case are substantially without dispute. They are established principally by the testimonies of two employees of
the plaintiff employer, and may be summarized as follows:
Deceased was employed by J. B. and R. E. Walker,
Inc., a Utah Corporation, engaged in the sand and gravel
business, and hereinafter designated as Walker (R. 1, 9,
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10). At the time of his employment, he had no particular

knowledge of machinery, and he was neither qualified
nor employed to operate any type of machinery (R. 10,
14, 24, 26). Dukes' title or assignment "Tas as "helper to
the plant operator" (R. 9, 10). His general duties, as
such, were to keep the plant cleaned up, and to help lubricate the machinery (R. 10). He also might be assigned
special duties by the plant operator (R. 10, 11).
As part of the equipment u.sed by Walker in it:3
operations was a machine designated as a Hough Loader
(R. 11). It was a machine mounted on four wheels, with
a scoop on the front, and which could be used to lift loads
of gravel or sand from ground level up into a truck (R.
11). Although its general operation was somewhat similar to that of an ordinary automobile, there were some
important differences, and because of certain peculiarities of the machine, its operation presented considerably
more danger than the operation of an ordinary automobile. (R. 11, 13). Such peculiarities included the following: (1) The wheels had short centers and would react
quicker and turn in tighter circles (R. 11). (2) Depression of the brake pedal would have the effect of disengaging the driving gears, an effect similar to the depression
of a clutch pedal on an ordinary passenger automobile
(R. 12). ( 3) Failure to apply full throttle would take
away part of the po,ver steering, 1naking the machine
Jllore difficult to control (R. 12-13). (4) The machine
was also top heavy, and therefore could easily be tipped
over, especially on uneven ground (R. 1!). In Walker's
opt~rations the 1naehine \v,as used for loading trucks and
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was used in three different general plant areas, all of
which were at different levels or elevations. Thus it was
necessary from time to time to move it from one portion
or area of the plant to another (R. 12, 13).
One of Walker's employees was regularly .assigned
to the operation of this machine, and he operated it about
90% of the time (R. 14-15, 17). However, the general
supervisor, J.\tlr. Reed, and several of the other en1ployees
(of whom Dukes wa.s not one), were trained and qualified
to operate it, and one of such persons could and did operate it in the .absence of the regular operator (R. 17-18).
Besides the machine above described, Walker had
various other types of machinery which were used in its
operations. It was the usual practice of Walker to train
all employees to operate all of the machines, so that each
could perform .any of the duties which might be required
of them. Dukes had been promised that he would be
taught to operate the various machines, including the
Hough Loader, (R. 15, 19), but up to the time of the
accident here involved, he had never received any training whatsoever in its operation (R. 15, 20-21), except that
on one Sunday the supervisor, Mr. Reed, had given him
sufficient instructions that he could drive it up the hill
(R. 14, 16, 17). Dukes had also w.anted to take the machine downhill on that same occasion, but had been specifically told by Reed not to take it downhill-that it was
too dangerous. The exact testimony of Reed on this
point is as follows :
"Q.

At that time did you give him any instruction
about taking the machine down the hill~
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A.

He wanted to bring it down that day, and I
told him no, that it was too dangerous. He
didn't know enough about it." (R. 14).

Reed also told him not to get on the machine until
he had learned to operate it:

"Q. Did you tell him anything about getting into
it or attempting to operate it~
A.

I told him that until he learned about it not
to get on it." (R. 14).

Reed also promised Dukes that he would eventually
be taught to operate the loader:

"Q. Did you ever have any general discussion
with Johnny Dukes about his being taught to
operate this Hough loader at some time~
A.

Yes. I told him that if he would stay with the
company, and work ~s he had been doing,
why that he would eventually learn how to
run the equipment, but that it just couldn't be
done as quickly as he wanted it done.

Q. Did you tell him, with reference to the Hough
loader, that he \Yould receive instructions in
the operation of that "Then there \vas an opportunity to do so~
A.

That's right." (R. 15).

1-Io\vever, up to the ti1ne of the fatal accident, Dukes
}tad never received nn~T further training on the 1nachine,
and had nevt>r been authorized to operate it (R. 14).
( )n l\ I ay 11, \Yhieh \Yas a Saturday, the plant was not
opP rating, but a ~ort of skeleton ere\\'" \Yns doing 1nain-
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tenance work (R. 16). Dukes had been detailed by Reed
to work that day as "scale 1nan." Hi.s duties were to
weigh trucks which came in for loads of sand or gravel
(R. 16). He was also directed to render any assistance
requested by Jim Batt, vvho was working with troughing
idlers on .a conveyor belt (R. 16, 24).
On the afternoon of that date, a truck came in for a
load of material. Dukes observed that the Hough Loader
vvhich vvould be used to load the truck, was not at that
level. Duke.s said he would go up to the upper level and
get the loader and bring it down (R. 25). At that time
Dukes was working with Batt, but Batt did not tell him
to go get the loader, nor did he order him not to get the
loader (R. 25). He merely inquired whether Dukes had
ever operated the loader before and Dukes replied in the
affirmative (R. 25, 30). At that time Mr. Reed and two
other men, properly qualified to operate the loader were
at the plant, and any of them could have brought the
loader down from the upper level to the lower level (R.
17). In fact it had been the intention of Mr. Reed to take
the loader down to the proper plant level when he completed checking some vvork with some welders (R. 22).
:;\Ir. Batt was also qualified to operate it and could have
brought it down (R. 17, 18, 26).
Two or three minutes after Dukes left to get the
loader, Batt, being concerned as to Dukes' ability to
operate it, drove a truck up to the upper level and arrived there just as Dukes was starting up the loader (R.
25-26). Again Batt inquired whether he had "run it,"
to which Dukes replied, "Hell, yes." (R. 26). Dukes sig-
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nailed Batt to precede him down the mountain, but Batt
refused to do so (R. 26). Dukes started down the mountain and almost immediately overturned the loader, sustaining injuries to himself which proved to be fatal (R. 7).
The surviving widow and minor child of the deceased Dukes duly filed their application for compensation benefits (R. 1) and a hearing thereon was held by
the Commission. Thereafter, the Commission entered its
order, in favor of the applicants .and awarding death
benefits to them (R. 45-46). In its decision, the Commission specifically recognized that decedent had been instructed not to operate the loader until he had been
taught to do so (R. 45). The Commission also recognized
the real and sole issue in the case :
"Assuming that deceased was instructed not
to oper.ate the loader until he had learned how to
operate it and as.suming that he had not learned
how to operate it as of ~1ay 11, 1957, was deceased
guilty of a departure from hi.s enzployment or did
he negligently perform a duty which he was permitted to do." (Emphasis ours.) (R. 45).
H.aving recognized the real issue the Co1mnission
then proceeded into the '\Yilderness and occluded that issue by throwing up a s1noke screen of false issues, as,
for exan1ple, "who ",.as to teach him when and how~ Who
,vas to detern1ine ",.hen he '\Yas qualified~" Certainly these
are responsibilities 'vhich '\Yould rest 'vith the employer.
It is not for the en1ployee to determine 'vhen he is qualified to use the en1ployer~s 1nachinery. The Commission
nl~o SP\'lllS to haYe been influenced by the fac.t that Batt
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did not order the deceased not to operate the loader,
although there is nothing in the record to indicate that
Batt had any authority to restrain him from so doing.
The record is clear beyond question that deceased
had been specifically instructed not to use the lo.ader
until he had been properly instructed in its operation, and
the Commission so found the fact to be (R. 15-16). The
record is equally clear that there were dangers inherent
in the operation of the machine, which made it advisable
for Walker to re.strict its operation to those properly
trained and qualified to do so. The applicants made no
effort whatsoever to shoulder the burden of proof cast
on them by law. No evidence was offered to suggest that
Dukes was ever authorized, even by implication, to operate the machine. All of the evidence in the record comes
from vValker's employees. All of it is to the effect that
decedent had been specifically prohibited from operating
the machine. Yet, in the f.ace of such a record, the Commission found that deceased was killed within "the scope
of his employment." (R. 46).
A petition for re-hearing was duly filed by the plaintiffs herein (R. 47), and said petition was duly denied
(R. 48). Thereafter on petition of plaintiffs herein (R.
49), this court duly issued its writ of certiorari to the
Commission (R. 52).

POINTS TO BE ARGUED
POINT I
THE DECEASED, JOHN ROBERT DUKES, BY ATTEMPTING TO OPERATE HIS EMPLOYER'S MACHINE,
IN VIOLATION OF INSTR.UCTIONS, DEPARTED FROM
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"THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT" AND THEREFORE
HIS DEATH WAS NOT COMPENSABLE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DECEASED, JO·HN ROBERT DUKES, BY ATL•
.TEMPTING TO OPERATE HIS EMPLOYER'S MACHINE~
IN VIOLATION OF INSTRUCTIONS, DEPARTED FROM
"THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT" AND THEREFORE
HIS DEATH WAS NOT COMPENSABLE.

We recognize, of course, that the evidence, and all
reasonable inferences therefrom must he viewed in the
light most f.avorable to the applicants; that the compen
sation act must be construed liberally in favor of the
applicants, and that all doubts must he resolved in favor
of the validity of the proceedings below. Conceding these
points, as we must, and in light of those principles, we
proceed to a consideration of the serious legal question
involved.
The court's problen1 is not one of exa1nining the
record to determine whether there is any evidence to
support the findings of the connnission. The evidence
is .all one 'vay, and the Con11nission found in accordance
,vith it, that the deceased en1ployee had been instructed
not to use the 1narhine until he had been instructed in its
operation. The con1n1ission concluded, for reasons not
Pntirely clear, that deceased 'vhile atten1pting to operate
the n1aehine, in direet violation of his en1ployer's orders,
\Yas acting \rithin the course of his e1nployn1ent. That
conclusion is not the finding of an ultimate fact, but
ratht\r a conrlnsion of la,v, going to the very jurisdiction
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of the Commission. As it has sometimes been put, perhaps inaccurately, this is the determination of a jurisdictional fact. It is, however, a matter for review by this
Court. For, if deceased, as a matter of law was not
engaged in the course of his employment, the Commission has no jurisdiction of the matter.
The principle that thi.s court will review the jurisdictional facts and \veigh them independently of the
Commission, see1ns to have been established in the case
of Ind~tstrial Con~m. v. Evans, 52 Utah 394, 174 P. 825.
This was one of the first cases decided under the Workmen's Compensation Act in this jurisdiction. It has been
consistently followed since that time.

Angel v. Ind. Comm., 64 Utah 105, 288 P. 509;
Luker Sand & Gravel Co. v. Ind. Comm., 82
Utah 188, 23 P. (2d) 225;
Weber County-Ogden City Relief Committee
v. Ind. Comm., 93 Utah 85, 71 P. (2d)
177;
Holt v. Ind. Comm., 96 Utah 484, 87 P. (2d)
686;
Miller v. Ind. Comm., 97 Utah 226, 92 P. (2d)
342;
Stover Bedding Co. v. Ind. Comm., 99 Utah
423, 107 P. (2d) 1027;
Rosenbaum v. Ind. Comm., 112 Utah 109, 185
P. (2d) 511;
Christean v. Ind. Con~m., 113 Utah 45, 196
P. (2d) 502;
Sommerville v. Ind. Comm., 113 Utah 504 196
P. (2d) 718.
'
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The particular problem presented in this case, is
whether the deceased by undertaking to operate his en1ployer's Hough Loader in direct violation of the instructions which he had received from his superior, departerl
from the scope of his employment, so as to take the accident out of the operation of the Compensation Act, or
whether in disobeying his employer's orders, he was
merely guilty of negligence, which would not affect the
rights of his dependents to death benefits under the act.
The Utah Act is silent as to the effect of a violation by
an employee of rules or regulations of his employer. This
is likewise true of the Compensation Acts of many of our
sister states. The problem here presented is not novel
to this court, and it has been treated judicially by the
courts of many other states, and especially states which
are heavily industrialized, and where problems of Workmens' Compensation frequently come before the court.
We shall consider first, the decisions from other jurisdictions to set the stage for the treatment of the precedents of this court.
The authorities are in general agree1nent that 'vhere
the prohibition relates merely to the rnauner of doing
an authorized or required 'vork, a violation on the part
of the e1nployee amounts to nothing 1nore than negligence,
\vhieh is not ,a defense under the Con1pensation Act, and
t ht>refore, recovery is pern1itted. Ho,vever, \Yhere the
reo-ulation
is. not direeted to the Inanner of perforn1ing
b
t hP ,vork, but rather is directed to,vard li1niting or defining- the 1rork f:o be accon1 pl ished, a violation on the
part 0 [' the Plllployee in engaging in a prohibited activity
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arnounts to a departure from the course of his employnlent, and an injury sustained at such time, under well
settled principles, is not compensable. The rules are
well stated in Vol. 1, Larson's Workmen's Compensa
tion Law, Sec. 31.00, page 457, as follows:
"When misconduct involves a prohibited overstepping of the boundaries defining the ultimate
work to be done by the claimant, the prohibited
act is outside the course of employment. But when
rnisconduct involves .a violation of regulations or
prohibitions relating to method of accomplishing
that ultimate work, the act remains within the
course of employment."
Follovving the statement of the rule, in the textual
discussion, the author cites many illustrations of cases
where the rule has been applied.
In Kasper v. Liberty Foundry Co., (Mo. App.), 54
S.W. (2d) 1002, a moulder, in violation of express orders
of his employer, went into the grinding room, .and attempted to do grinding work. A piece of emery flew into
his eye, injuring it, for which he sought compensation.
In denying compensation, the court said:
"If the employee is injured in the doing of
sornething outside the regular duties for which he
is employed, but which is not wholly beyond and
disassociated from his employment proper, and
tends ultimately to react to the employer's benefit,
then, absent any question of the effect of the violation of a positive order not to have done such
act, he is quite natur.ally to be held to have been
injured by accident arising out of and in the
course of his employment. But the employer does
have the undoubted right to limit the scope of
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his servant's employment. In the very nature of
things, work falls into different cla.ssifications,
some of which anyone may safely perform no
matter how little his ability, but others of which
are attended with risks and haz.ards which can
be avoided only by those equipped with the requisite skill and experience to meet them. The recognition of this fact is required in the proper organization of any industrial plant, not only for the
sake of efficiency with which we as a court are
not so much concerned, but equally for the very
important purpose of guarding .against accident,
and injury which do bring the Compensation Act
into play. Consequently an employee should not
be permitted to intermeddle by his own violation
with something entirely outside of the work for
which he is employed, and then, when injured
while so doing, to claim and receive compensation
upon the plea that his act was designed for tlz e
gain of his employer as well." (Emphasis ours.)

On rehearing, the .applicant argued that the provisions of a Missouri statute providing for a reduction of
15% of the an1ount of the a\vard \Vhere the en1ployee
had violated orders, had been overlooked, and that the
statute clearly indicated that a violation of orders \vould
not result in defeating con1pensation. In rejecting this
position, the same court said, con11nencing at page 1006
of 54 s.,-v. (2d) :
'~In

other ''Tords, if there is no question about
the e1nployee haYing acted \Yithin the scope of hi~
P1nploy1nent~ though he 1nay haYe done an authori~Pd net in a forbidden 111anner, he is neverthPle~~ entitled to co1npensation: but the statute
ha.s 110 application to the case 'lchere the enzployee
goes nutl"''ide the duties for 'lrllich he -is en1ployed
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and is injured while so doing, since to interpret
the statute in that manner would have the effect
of leaving it to the employee to select his own
"'~ork, regardless of what the wishes of the employer might be, subject only to his compensation
being reduced 15% for an injury received while
he was acting in violation of the limitations fixed
by his employer." (Emphasis ours.)
In Holloway v. Ideal Seating Co., 313 Mich. 267, 211
N. vV. (2d) 125, a helper to a punch press operator was
injured \\Thile operating the machine contrary to his em-ployer's express instructions to leave all machines alone .
The Supreme Court of Michigan carefully reviewed the
other decisions of that court, citing and quoting many
cases illustrating the general rule. It quoted from
Bischoff v. An~erican Car & Foitndry Co., 190 ~{ich. 229,
157 ~.\V. 13, a.s follows:
"The rule is sound. It Inay be modified in the
case of an emergency or in other special circumstances. But, fundamentally, the option is not in
the employee to extend the course of his e1npZoy·
1nent upon the sole ground that his act m.ay be for
the employer's benefit. An eniployer has the right
to prescribe the duties of an employee. If work
is hazardous, he must have the ri.rJht to protect
hitnself against liability for accident by selecting
competent persons to do it. Employees may not
impose liability upon the employer by leaving the
work they were hired to do and voluntarily and
without his knowledge or acquiescence doing
something else." (Emphasis ours.)
The court concluded that the accident did not arise
out of the claimant's employ1nent within the meaning
of the above rule, and therefore compensation was denied
.A. series of New York cases, well illustrate the rule .
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In Rendina v. Continental Can Company, 226 N.Y. 565,
123 N.E. 886, the claimant was employed by the defendant
to dip cans in a liquid. On the day of the accident, after
finishing his own work, he attempted to operate a stamping machine in violation of orders and sustained an injury for which he sought compensation. In Burch v.
Rampano Iron Works, 210 App. Div. 506, 206 N.Y.S. 868,
an employee whose duty it was to operate an air hammer
undertook to pull an iron clamp from a furnace in violation of specific instructions. In so doing he sustained an
injury for which he sought compensation. In Hyatt v.
U.S. Rubber Reclaiming Co., 256 N.Y. 571, 177 N.E. 144,
the claimant was a foreman in the tube department of a
rubber reclaiming business. In violation of orders, he
undertook to saw a board with a circular rip saw in the
mechanical department. While so doing, he received an
injury for which he sought compensation. In each of
these three cases, the court held that the employee had
departed from the course of his employment, and denied
compensation.
In Kensington Steel Corp. v. Industrial Cornm., 385
Ill. 504, 53 N .E. ( 2d) 395, a truck driver attempted to re-pair a steel 1nill, believing it to be in need of repair, but
when in fact it \Vas not, and no e1nergency existed. The
Illinoi~ SuprenH? Court held, in accordance \vith the rule
above stated, that the e1nployee had departed from the
seopP of his rinploynH?nt. A sin1ilar holding 'v.as reached
in Shofj'lcr Y. Lelli.oli TTalley Coal Co .. 290 Pa . .J-SO, 139
A. 1!l~, \vher(~ n 8pragger at defendanfs coal 1nine at
t.c1nptPd to OJH~rnte a. locon1otive " . .hich \vas in violation
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not only of his employer's rules, but also of state statute.
And in Cohen v. Birmingham Fabricating Co., 224 Ala.
67, 139 So. 97, defendant's sales manager was killed while
unloading steel in violation of his employer's instructions.
It was held that he was not in the course of his employment.
A case somewhat novel on its facts is Black v. Town
of Springfield, 217 S.C. 413, 60 S.E. (2d) 854. There the
Chief of Police rode on the town fire engine to fires not-withstanding that he had been explicitly directed not to
do so by both the Mayor and the Town Council. On one
such adventure, he fell from the truck and was killed.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina correctly held that
he was not engaged in the course of his employment.
It will be noted that nearly .all of the foregoing cases
come from heavily industrialized states, where problems
on Workmen's Compensation come frequently before the
courts. It is interesting to note that the holdings of this
court are entirely in accord with the decisions above
cited.
Apparently the earliest Utah decision which treats
this question and the one most similar in point of fact,
(.and therefore the one most helpful to this court in the
determination of the case at bar), is Utah Copper Co. v.
Industrial Comm., 217 Pac. 1005. In that case a brakeman and fireman exchanged positions to equalize the
hardships of stormy weather. Each was fully qualified
to perform the work of the other, and the exchange was
n1ade with the consent of the engineer. The train became
involved in a collision, and the brakeman, while acting
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as fireman, was killed. This court held that he had de~
p.arted from the scope of his employment, and his death
was not compensable. The court quoted with approval
from 1 Honnold on Workmen's Compensation, Sec. 114,
as follows:
"An accident does not arise out of the employment, if, at the time, the workman is arrogating
to himself duties which he was neither engaged
nor entitled to perform."
The above rule has been consistently and repeatedly
followed by this court in cases which have subsequently
come before it for consider.ation and decision.
In Salt Lake City v. Ind. Co1nm., (Ut.), 137 Pac. (2d)
364, compensation -vvas denied to an e1nployee who in
violation of a rule of his employer attempted to salvage
material from the city dun1p. \\TI1ile so engaged he be:came engaged in an altercation with .another employee
and was injured.
In Buhler v. Maddison (Ut.), 166 Pac. (2d) 205, the
di.stinction bet-vveen the doing of a prohibited act and
the doing of a proper act in a prohibited n1anner 'vas
noted and recognized.
Apparently the 1nost recent decision on the subject
in this jurisdiction, is J/. & K. Corporation v. Ind1tstrial
(\Jnun .. (lTt.), 189 Pac. (~d) 13~. In that case a truck
d1·iv(\l' lH'rinitted hi8 8011. 'vho "~as too young to haYe an
OlH\rntnr'~ liePn~e, to operate his e1nployer's truck in the
enur~P of his regular e1nployn1ent of transporting mal<'rial~ for hi~ <\lnployer'~ benefit. The court held that
thi~ "·a~ doing a proper net in a prohibited 1nanner r.ather
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than doing a prohibited act. However, this court specifically recognized the rule, as laid down by Larson, in the
following language :
"Not every violation by an employee of a
statutory provision or of a rule or regulation of
his employer constitutes a departure from the
course of his employment. The general rule is
that where the employee, at the time of the accident, is engaged in doing a thing or rendering a
service which he is employed or authorized to do,
either expressly or by the nature of and the surrounding facts and circumstances of his employment, or is doing something which is incidental
thereto, but does such act or renders such service
or incidental in an unlawful or forbidden manner,
he does not thereby depart from the course of his
employment even though the accident occurs as a
consequence of such violation. It is only when the
act or service which the employee is performing is
itself prohibited, as distinguished from the manner in which the act is done or the services performed, that the violation of the employer takes
the employee outside of the course of his employment and defeats a recovery." (Emphasis ours.)
In concluding, the court observed :
"The true test is: Was the regulation calculated to limit the scope of the employment or was
it calculated only to govern the manner of performing a more comprehensive task. * * *
"In this respect there is room for great divergence of opinion. No comprehensive, all inclu~ive
rule has been or can be stated which will determine all cases, each case has to be determined on
its own facts."
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CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that under the authorities
above cited, and quoted, there is no room for a finding
that the decea.sed in this case was engaged in the course
of his employment at the time of his injuries. The record
is clear that he was engaged in the performance of an
act repeatedly and specifically prohibited by his employer. In undertaking to do this act, dece.ased sought
to impose upon his employer risks for his own safety.
which the employer had not assumed, and also the risk
of damage to his employer's machine. Well settled principles require that the claim be denied.
,The order of the Industrial Commission should be
set aside, and the Commission should be directed to enter
an order denying the claim.
Respectfully submitted,
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN &
CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for plaintiff
1205 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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